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In modern scholarship, the "late" period of the Roman army begins with the accession of the Emperor Diocletian in AD 284, and ends in 476 with the deposition of Romulus Augustulus, being roughly coterminous with the Dominate. During the period 395–476, the army of the Roman Empire's western half progressively disintegrated, while its counterpart in the East, known as the East Roman army (or the early Byzantine army) remained largely intact in size and structure until the reign of Justinian I (r. AD 527-565).〔 The Imperial Roman army of the Principate (30 BC-AD 284) underwent a significant transformation as a result of the chaotic 3rd century. Unlike the army of the Principate, the army of the 4th century was heavily dependent on conscription and its soldiers were paid much less than in the 2nd century. Barbarians from outside the empire probably supplied a much larger proportion of the late army's recruits than in the army of the 1st and 2nd centuries, but there is little evidence that this adversely affected the army's performance. Scholarly estimates of the size of the 4th-century army diverge widely, ranging from ca. 400,000 to over one million effectives (i.e. from roughly the same size as the 2nd-century army to 2 or 3 times larger).〔Treadgold 43-60〕 This is due to fragmentary evidence, unlike the much better-documented 2nd-century army. Under the Tetrarchy, military commands were separated from administrative governorships for the first time, in contrast to the Principate, where provincial governors were also commanders-in-chief of all military forces deployed in their provinces. The main change in structure from the 2nd-century army was the establishment of large escort armies (''comitatus praesentales''), typically containing 20,000-30,000 top-grade palatini troops. These were normally based near the imperial capitals: (Constantinople in the East, Milan in the West), thus far from the Empire's borders. These armies' primary function was to deter usurpers, and they usually campaigned under the personal command of their emperors. The legions were split up into smaller units comparable in size to the auxiliary regiments of the Principate. Infantry adopted the more protective equipment of the Principate cavalry. The role of cavalry in the late army does not appear to have been greatly enhanced as compared with the army of the Principate. The evidence is that cavalry was much the same proportion of overall army numbers as in the 2nd century and that its tactical role and prestige remained similar. However, the cavalry of the Late Roman army was endowed with greater numbers of specialised units, such as extra-heavy shock cavalry (cataphractii and clibanarii) and mounted archers.〔Elton (1994) 106-107〕 During the later 4th century, the cavalry acquired a reputation for incompetence and cowardice for their role in three major battles. In contrast, the infantry retained its traditional reputation for excellence. The 3rd and 4th centuries saw the upgrading of many existing border forts to make them more defensible, as well as the construction of new forts with stronger defenses. The interpretation of this trend has fuelled an ongoing debate whether the army adopted a defence-in-depth strategy or continued the same posture of "forward defence" as in the early Principate. Many elements of the late army's defence posture were similar to those associated with forward defence, such as forward location of forts, frequent cross-border operations, and external buffer-zones of allied barbarian tribes. Whatever the defence strategy, it was apparently less successful in preventing barbarian incursions than in the 1st and 2nd centuries. This may have been due to heavier barbarian pressure, and/or to the practice of keeping large armies of the best troops in the interior, depriving the border forces of sufficient support. ==Sources== Much of our evidence for 4th century army unit deployments is contained in a single document, the ''Notitia Dignitatum'', compiled c. 395–420, a manual of all late Roman public offices, military and civil. The main deficiency with the ''Notitia'' is that it lacks any personnel figures so as to render estimates of army size impossible. Also, it was compiled at the very end of the 4th century; it is thus difficult to reconstruct the position earlier. However, the ''Notitia'' remains the central source on the late Army's structure due to the dearth of other evidence.〔Lee (1997) 212〕 The ''Notitia'' also suffers from significant ''lacunae'' and numerous errors accumulated from centuries of copying. The main literary sources for the 4th-century army are the ''Res Gestae'' (History) of Ammianus Marcellinus, whose surviving books cover the period 353 to 378. Marcellinus, himself a veteran soldier, is regarded by scholars as a reliable and valuable source. But he largely fails to remedy the deficiencies of the ''Notitia'' as regards army and unit strength or units in existence, as he is rarely specific about either. The third major source for the late army is the corpus of imperial decrees published in the East Roman empire in the 5th and 6th centuries: the Theodosian code (438) and the Corpus Iuris Civilis (528–39). These compilations of Roman laws dating from the 4th century contain numerous imperial decrees relating to all aspects of the regulation and administration of the late army. ''De re militari'', a treatise on Roman military affairs by Vegetius, a late 4th or early 5th-century writer, contains considerable information on the late army, although its focus is on the army of the Republic and Principate. However, Vegetius (who wholly lacked military experience) is often unreliable. For example, he stated that the army abandoned armour and helmets in the later 4th century (offering the absurd explanation that this equipment was too heavy), which is contradicted by sculptural and artistic evidence.〔Elton (1996) 110–5〕 In general, it is not safe to accept a statement from Vegetius unless it is corroborated by other evidence. Scholars of the late army have to contend with a dramatic diminution of the epigraphic record in the 3rd and 4th centuries, compared with the 1st and 2nd centuries. diplomas were no longer issued to retiring auxiliaries after 203 (most likely because almost all were already Roman citizens by then). In addition, there was a huge reduction in the number of tombstones, altars and other dedications by Roman servicemen. Official stamps of military units on building materials (''e.g.'' tiles) are much rarer. But this trend should probably not be seen as indicating a decline in the army's administrative sophistication. Papyrus evidence from Egypt shows that military units continued to keep detailed written records in the 4th century (the vast bulk of which are lost due to organic decomposition). Most likely, the decline in inscriptions is due to changing fashion, in part influenced by the increase in barbarian recruits and the rise of Christianity.〔Mattingly (2006) 247–8〕 The dearth of inscriptions leaves major gaps in our understanding of the late army and renders many conclusions tentative. The seminal modern study of the late army is contained in ''The Later Roman Empire, 284-602'' (LRE) by the "high priest" of late Roman studies, A.H.M. Jones. Because of its wealth of detail and documentary references, this 1964 publication remains an essential tool for all scholars of the period. However, its primary weakness is its age, for a considerable amount of archaeological work and other relevant scholarship has transpired in the decades since its publication. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Late Roman army」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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